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Initial Reflections
The pace of progress in population health can be influ-
enced  by  the  incentives  in  play  and  the  metrics  that 
trigger  them.  The  MATCH  (Mobilizing  Action  Toward 
Community  Health)  articles  in  this  issue  of  Preventing 
Chronic Disease explore the use of incentives to improve 
population health and hold implications for the develop-
ment and application of the measures to which they are 
linked. Metrics in population health can serve to draw and 
focus attention, encourage action, and direct rewards and 
penalties. When those rewards and penalties take on an 
economic dimension, the results can be powerful.
This potential application of population health measures 
is especially important if the aim is to transform the allo-
cation of social energy and resources, as it clearly must be. 
Currently, our national health investment profile is deeply 
flawed — more than 95% of every health dollar goes to 
treatment rather than prevention. In a system in which 
all our salient incentives are structured to reward volume 
over value, we miss virtually no opportunity to treat dis-
ease, often unsuccessfully or erroneously.
On the other hand, each day we miss countless opportu-
nities to prevent disease and promote health. If we seek to 
reform health care payment systems to yield better health 
returns, investment in prevention has to move to the high-
est — not lowest — priority. If our aim is to fashion the 
health equivalent of indicators that shape our economic 
policies,  the  most  rational  social  investment  strategy 
would center around prevention and our health care pay-
ment system would follow suit.
A reformed health care payment system can advance 
health as the fundamental priority in 3 ways. First, every 
American should receive coverage for the clinical preven-
tive services that are appropriate to him or her without 
copayment. Second, grant support should be set aside for 
community-based initiatives that are necessary to improve 
the health and health care of the community’s residents. 
Finally, resources to address the overall health care needs 
of a population should be shaped by a blend of the com-
munity’s health needs and efforts, as reflected by metrics 
that indicate trends for determinants of the population’s 
health status.
The Articles
The articles in this issue present a number of perspectives 
relevant to considering how incentives might work for popu-
lation health improvement. Described below are common 
elements and how we might think about using incentives.
Haveman introduces the economist’s perspective of the 
concept, structure, and function of incentives — financial 
and  nonfinancial  —  including  examples  from  education, 
jobs, and health (1). Mullahy reviews the conceptual chal-
lenges in transferring insights from targeting incentives for 
personal health services to possible effects on population 
health, including issues related to accounting for the pro-
duction function for population health and the roles of mul-
tiple sectors (2). Rothschild shows the relevance of social 
marketing as a factor in improving population health (3).
Witte  looks  at  performance  metrics  and  rewards  in 
education as a reference point for population health (4). 
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Baxter  identifies  incentive  options  if  no  new  resources 
are available, for example, using existing but unenforced 
requirements  (such  as  those  related  to  the  nutritional 
content of school meals), using the purchasing power of 
government or emphasizing “cobenefits” (such as taxes on 
tobacco that offer disincentives and raise revenues) (5). 
Asch assesses the applicability of paying for performance 
in health care to population health (6).
Fox looks at the nature and evolving results of “triple 
aim”  efforts,  with  emphasis  on  health  care,  population 
health, and cost reduction, including how a “value divi-
dend” might most effectively be characterized (7). Oliver 
describes the potential incentives inherent in population 
health rankings such as MATCH, including how to link 
them  to  key  uses  such  as  identifying  problems,  setting 
agendas,  and  changing  community  policies  (8).  Smith 
reviews the European experience with setting heath tar-
gets,  noting,  for  example,  the  challenges  in  setting  the 
targets (which ones, outcomes vs process, how to quantify, 
cross-sector responsibilities) and in translating some of the 
key population health aims to the local level (9).
Each of the articles is rich with examples of economic 
incentives, such as  the use of graduate medical education 
payments  by  Medicare  to  teaching  hospitals  (1).  Many 
of  the  examples,  however,  can  have  unintended  conse-
quences:
• The  intent  of  developing  the  diagnosis-related  groups 
(DRGs) — paying a flat fee for a group of services for a 
given condition — is to blunt the tendency of fee-for-ser-
vice to increase service volume. Some “gaming” occurs, 
however, such as listing healthy patients under a more 
expensive DRG category or dividing the treatment into 
multiple admissions or episodes (6).
• Merit pay in education in Wisconsin did not appear to 
yield the educational value anticipated for teacher per-
formance,  judged  by  the  year-to-year  identification  of 
high-performing teachers (4).
• The  Child  Nutrition  Act  has  provisions  for  nutrition 
and  wellness  programs,  but  these  are  often  unen-
forced because states view them as unfunded mandates. 
The  situation  is  similar  in  the  persistent  number  of 
eligible-but-unenrolled  children  in  the  Early  Periodic 
Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Program and the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (5).
• Pay-for-performance as a motivating strategy to improve 
clinical care may have perverse consequences. For exam-
ple, providing extra payment based on the percentage of 
diabetes patients whose glycated hemoglobin levels are 
below 7% has led to clinician avoidance of difficult-to-
manage patients and to overdiagnosing and overtreating 
patients with borderline levels (6).
• Prominent  public  reporting  of  coronary  bypass  graft 
death  rates  in  New  York  State  led  to  an  increased 
number of operations in New York on patients with less 
severe illness and, alternatively, to referral of patients 
with more severe illness to border states for treatment 
(6).
• In assessing health system performance in the United 
Kingdom, where resources were allocated to perceived 
need, some managers disregarded the threat of damage 
to their reputations and were happy to use poor perfor-
mance scores on what they viewed as unimportant pro-
cesses as a strategy to get more resources, while other 
managers worked efficiently and received no reward for 
their superior performance (9).
Common Elements in Considering 
Incentives
While the authors of these MATCH articles approached 
their assignments differently, they touch on common ele-
ments that should be considered in assessing the intended 
impact of incentives:
1.	 Nature	of	the	targeted	actor. Is the focus on a per-
son making a personal decision, or is it an institutional 
decision maker or geographic collective? What is the 
relevant sector of action — health, education, environ-
ment, transportation?
2.	 Nature	of	the	targeted	change. Is change antici-
pated  at  a  single  locus  (such  as  institutional,  geo-
graphic, or cultural) or, as is more frequently the case, 
is it multilevel in nature?
3.	 Choice	of	measures. What measures will be used? 
Are they individual or are they summary in nature? 
What are the implications for their interpretation?
4.	 Types	of	incentives. Which of the multiple incentive 
approaches — financial, regulatory, legal, reputation-
al, and educational — is most appropriate? Will the 
incentive be a reward or a penalty?
5.	 Processes	used. Will recipients of the incentives par-
ticipate in developing the incentive scheme, or will it 
be imposed with minimal consultation? Does the con-
templated action directly target the desired outcome, VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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or is it indirect — for example, clean indoor air laws to 
reduce tobacco use or revenue-enhancing excise taxes 
to reduce soda use?
6.	 Decisional	 environment.  How  supportive  is  the 
operative culture to direct or indirect social interven-
tion?  For  example,  how  receptive  will  political  and 
social leaders be to the health sector’s seeking change 
in education, housing, or other social services, accord-
ing to the potential effect on health?
7.	 Funding	stream	involved. Is the funding or support 
stream for the incentive likely to be episodic or sus-
tained? Is it the product of a temporary public-private 
initiative? Is it an ongoing grant program? Is it embed-
ded as part of a broad entitlement change?
8.	 Possible	unintended	consequences. What are the 
ways in which the contemplated incentive might dis-
tort the result or lead to new problems?
Hierarchy of Potential Uses
Incentives, explicit or implicit, are inherent in metrics. 
Even  independent  of  economic  components,  the  mere 
establishment and monitoring of targets can impact repu-
tation,  recognition,  and  the  inclination  or  disinclination 
toward alliances and can alter behavior. Because conse-
quences, intended and unintended, can be both real and 
severe, care is needed in the choice of incentives. In effect, 
a certain hierarchy of consideration should be operative in 
their choice:
1.	 Do	 no	 harm.  The  golden  rule  of  any  policy  is  to 
ensure that its net result is salutary. Attention must 
first be devoted to understanding and assessing poten-
tial detrimental consequences, including consequences 
of inaccuracy and misuse, and taking steps to avoid 
them.
2.	 Educate. Choose measurement targets that can edu-
cate about issues. Some targets can make a difference 
in progress merely by being included in the metrics 
set.
3.	 Signal.  Choose  metrics  that  signal  the  importance 
of issues, through the structure and reporting of the 
effort.
4.	 Celebrate. Choose metrics that identify and celebrate 
the  successes  of  prevention,  when  prevention’s  suc-
cesses may be otherwise silent.
5.	 Enable. Choose metrics that can help forge partner-
ships and common bonds across sectors with mutual 
interests, for example, health with environment, edu-
cation, and housing.
6.	 Motivate. Identify measures that can help motivate 
communitywide  public  action,  through  information 
that offers broad perspective about community oppor-
tunities  and  shortfalls,  such  as  MATCH’s  potential 
provision of comparative population health informa-
tion and community ranking.
7.	 Empower.  Marshal  community  support  to  engage 
and act on issues with particular “public good” qual-
itities, such as advocacy for healthy school environ-
ments, clean water, clean air, and food safety.
8.	 Reward.  Structure  economic  reward  systems  care-
fully, given the potential for distortion.
9.	 Punish. Shape sanctions or penalties when necessary, 
again carefully, given the potential for distortion.
This  hierarchy  of  uses  varies  by  circumstance.  For 
example, punishment could be higher on the list in the 
case of egregious potential public threat, for example, the 
potential release of a populationwide health contaminant. 
Nonetheless,  the  hierarchy  frames  important  starting 
considerations.
Conclusion
Our understanding of how metrics and their incentives 
can enlighten, motivate, change, and advance population 
health  will  continue  to  mature.  Addressing  the  chal-
lenges elucidated in the MATCH articles in this issue of 
Preventing  Chronic  Disease  could  refocus  the  resources 
available  in  the  United  States  to  improve  population 
health.
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